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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-3209 
______________ 
 
EVETTE BOYLE, 
                     Appellant 
       
v. 
 
PMA MEDICAL SPECIALISTS, LLC; 
JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
NOS. 1-10 
     
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-02492) 
District Judge: Hon. C. Darnell Jones, II  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 15, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and PORTER, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed:  January 16, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
______________ 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
Plaintiff Evette Boyle appeals the District Court’s order granting Defendant PMA 
Medical Specialists, LLC’s (“PMA”) motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  Because Boyle failed to file a “proof of claim” with the Bankruptcy 
Court before PMA’s reorganization plan was confirmed and PMA has been discharged of 
debts that arose before the plan’s confirmation, her lawsuit is barred.  Therefore, we will 
affirm the order dismissing her complaint.   
I1 
Boyle filed an employment discrimination suit against PMA in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Unbeknownst to Boyle, before 
she commenced her lawsuit, PMA filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania set a July 8, 2016 deadline for 
any creditors to file claims against PMA.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(3).  After Boyle 
filed her lawsuit, PMA amended its schedule of unsecured claims to include Boyle’s 
claim as “disputed,” App. 49, and served her with notice of the July 8, 2016 deadline to 
file a proof of claim.  Boyle did not file a proof of claim.         
PMA eventually served Boyle with its reorganization plan.  The Bankruptcy Court 
thereafter confirmed the plan, and PMA moved to close the bankruptcy.  Boyle did not 
                                              
1 We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
233 (3d Cir. 2008), and may consider matters of public record, such as the items filed in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, see Schmidt 
v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).   
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object to the plan or the motion to close the bankruptcy.  Instead, Boyle sought relief 
from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) that was triggered by the bankruptcy 
petition.  The Bankruptcy Court found that while Boyle did not knowingly violate the 
stay when she first filed her lawsuit in District Court, she did not file a proof of claim and 
her request for relief from the stay was “moot” because the bankruptcy proceeding was 
already closed.  App. 171.   
Based on the Bankruptcy Court proceedings, PMA moved to dismiss Boyle’s 
employment discrimination complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted 
the motion to dismiss, holding that her failure to file a proof of claim barred her suit and 
her employment discrimination claims were discharged in bankruptcy.  Boyle appeals, 
contending that her discrimination claims are exempt from discharge in bankruptcy.2    
II3 
“[O]ne of the principal purposes of bankruptcy law” is “to secure within a limited 
period the prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the debtor’s estate.”  
Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995).  To this end, the bankruptcy 
rules provide a mechanism to gather creditors’ claims to determine how to allocate the 
assets of the bankruptcy estate.  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(2) 
provides that “[a]ny creditor . . . whose claim . . . is . . . scheduled as disputed . . . shall 
file a proof of claim within the time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule.”  Rule 
                                              
2 Boyle appeals only the District Court’s order.   
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 230. 
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3003(c)(3), in turn, provides that the bankruptcy court sets the date “proofs of claim . . . 
may be filed” and may extend this deadline “for cause.”  Rule 3003(c)(3)’s deadline is 
known as the “bar date.”  Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346.  After the bar date, “a claimant 
cannot participate in the reorganization unless she establishes sufficient grounds for the 
failure to file a proof of claim.”  Id.   
Because PMA listed Boyle’s claim as “disputed,” App. 49, and the Bankruptcy 
Court set a bar date of July 8, 2016, Boyle needed to file a proof of claim by that date.  
Id. at 344-45 (“Stated simply, under bankruptcy law, the bar claims date is the last day on 
which existing claims can be filed against the debtor.”).  Boyle did not do so.  As a result, 
Boyle was not listed as a creditor with a claim against PMA.  
Once PMA’s reorganization plan was confirmed, it was discharged “from any debt 
that arose before the date of such confirmation . . . .”4  11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A); 
Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346.  The discharge “operates as [a permanent] injunction against 
the commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect, recover or offset any such 
debt as a personal liability of the debtor . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2); In re Germaine, 
152 B.R. 619, 623 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993).  However, a § 1141 discharge “does not 
                                              
4 “The term ‘debt’ means liability on a claim.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(12); Wright v. 
Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 104 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012).  “Claim” is broadly defined as a “right to 
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,” and it may be “disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(5); Ohio v. 
Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985) (observing that “Congress desired a broad definition of 
a ‘claim’” under the Bankruptcy Code).   
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discharge an individual debtor” from debts “for willful and malicious injury” caused by 
the “debtor to another entity . . . .”5  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).   
Under § 1141’s discharge rule, the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation of PMA’s 
reorganization plan, permanently enjoined Boyle from pursuing her discrimination claims 
against PMA.  Because Boyle was not entitled to relief once the reorganization plan was 
confirmed, the District Court did not err in dismissing her complaint.  11 U.S.C. § 524(a); 
Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal of discrimination claim because it was discharged in bankruptcy).  
Boyle asserts that the “willful and malicious injury” exception to the discharge 
rule precludes dismissal.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).  The exception does not apply.  By its 
terms, this exception applies to “individual debtor[s].”  Id.  PMA, however, is a corporate 
debtor.  See In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc., 863 F.2d 832, 834 (11th Cir. 1989) (“A 
corporate debtor is not an individual debtor for the purposes of Section 523.”); Yamaha 
Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e hold that 
the exemptions embodied in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) do not apply to corporate debtors.”).  
Thus, the “willful and malicious injury” exception to dischargeability does not save 
Boyle’s complaint.6       
                                              
5 The § 523(a) exceptions are “liberally construed in favor of debtors.”  In re 
Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995).    
6 Because we “may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the 
record,” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), we need not address whether Boyle’s complaint was void ab 
initio when she filed it without obtaining relief from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a); Mar. Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1991) 
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III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.7 
                                              
(stating “[a]bsent relief from the stay, judicial actions and proceedings against the debtor 
are void ab initio.”).   
7 Because there is a legal bar to Boyle’s complaint, and there is no further action 
required by her counsel, his motion to withdraw is denied as moot. 
